The Oslo Accords’ Unintended Consequences

Assuming the alternative to be worse, Israeli governments, including those that opposed Oslo and warned of the diplomatic ruse from the start, have consistently avoided holding the P.A. accountable. Assuming that accountability might include the collapse of the P.A., and that its collapse necessarily means the return of the IDF to the task of municipal management of Palestinian Arab population centers, all egregious P.A. violations of the agreements they signed have been formally criticized but functionally ignored.

Aside from the morally reprehensible position of tolerating broadscale incitement to murder—for many, reason enough to abandon such a laissez-faire attitude toward agreement violations—this has led to several unintended consequences. Each consequence is significant enough to warrant a change of policy, but cumulatively, they leave Israel with no choice but to immediately and effectively move to a consistent and unambiguous policy of conditionality and accountability.

The “cobra effect,” “blowback” and the law of unintended consequences

The “law of unintended consequences” is a concept in political, economic and sociological theory that dates back at least to John Locke in the 17th century. The “law” refers to an outcome or outcomes of a purposeful action that is/are unforeseen or unanticipated. The unintended outcome is often driven by a “perverse incentive,” which produces results contrary to the intentions of its designers. Perhaps the best example of a perverse incentive is the “cobra effect.”

During the British rule of India, New Delhi was infested with cobras. When British officials offered a bounty on cobra skins in the hope that financial incentives would help enlist the public in the effort to eradicate the snakes, the problem got much worse. The cobra population increased as people began to breed cobras in pursuit of compensation. When the British caught on and terminated the program, the now worthless cobras were set free, creating greater danger to the public than before. German economist Horst Siebert dubbed this form of unintended consequence the “cobra effect.”

The CIA uses a different term to describe the unintended consequences of their operations—“blowback.” The covert operation supporting the Afghan Mujahideen dubbed “Operation Cyclone,” was intended to overthrow the communist regime that had taken hold of Afghanistan. It was a Cold War strategy to stop the spread of communism, but it resulted in the destabilization of Afghanistan and the rise of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These consequences, hardly on the CIA’s radar screen, were wholly unintended and unforeseen.

Would the CIA have continued with “Operation Cyclone” had they anticipated the blowback? The rise of Al-Qaeda, the 9/11 attacks and the wars and mayhem that ensued? It is fair to say “no.”

And it is fair to ask the same question and provide the same answer regarding Oslo. Would the designers of the Oslo Accords have proceeded with the legitimization of the PLO and its empowerment through the establishment of the P.A. if they had known what the consequences would be?