Iran’s Destructive Role In The Re-Establishment Of The Taliban

Malikzada emphasized that the international community betrayed the Afghan people and added that although the people of Afghanistan felt betrayed, they still hoped that the Republic of Afghanistan would defend them against the Taliban. However, the sudden surrender of the provinces to the Taliban in a matter of days, and the government’s unplanned exit increased panic among the public. When the people heard that their president had fled, they all felt completely deceived and betrayed, this time from the republican system that they thought would be defended.

He then spoke about Afghanistan’s interior problems after the Taliban came and concluded: “In fact, although the republic has so far failed to solve the problems of the Afghan people and meet their essential needs, the Afghan people have nevertheless preferred to support it till today because they believed they could influence the central government by the power of their vote. But what the future holds for the people after today depends on how the Taliban are going to establish their system. Emirate with strict laws that were twenty years ago or Emirate with changes for the role of women and to some extent also the individual freedoms of citizens. The next few days will tell us all.

Iran and the Taliban have gone back many years and many believe that some of the Taliban leaders had been living in Iran for a long time. Siawash Mohammadi, a journalist and political analyst in Germany, has classified periods of this relationship into three parts, with the first part being from the emergence of the Taliban in 1994 to the fall of the Islamic Emirate in 2001: “During this period, relations between Iran and the Taliban, led by the foreign section of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and in particular the current commander of the Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, have faced ups and downs. Despite all ideological differences, the Quds Force supported and used Taliban troops to transact drugs on the country’s western borders and balance Afghanistan’s internal civil war.”

 Mohammadi emphasizes the role of the IRGC Quds forces in this relationship and points to the second period: “The second phase of relations between the Revolutionary Guards and the Taliban was after the US and its Western allies had invaded Afghanistan.  A significant part of the Taliban had fled to Iran and settled in the Iranian provinces of Khorasan as well as Sistan and Baluchestan. During this period, relations between Iran and the Taliban were based on enmity with a common enemy, in other words, the United States and its allied forces in Afghanistan.”

“The third phase of this relationship is between 2011 to 2016 especially with the culmination of a plan to withdraw the US and allied forces from Afghanistan,” Mohammadi concluded. 

“Despite an agreement between the Iranian and Afghan governments over the shared waters of the Helmand and Harirud rivers, the Afghan government’s strategic agreement with the United States and the issue of drug exports to Europe by groups close to the Revolutionary Guards are some of the reasons for Iranian support for the Taliban.”